*Some Known & Unknown Facts about the 1971 India-Pakistan War*

*Some Known & Unknown Facts about the 1971 India-Pakistan War* -- Col Ashwani Sharma (retd), Editor-in-Chief, "South Asia Defence & Strategic Review" It was *September 2007*. I had just left the Army and moved to Delhi to take over as the Editor of "South Asia Defence & Strategic Review". *Rajan Arya*, a dear friend and owner of *Pentagon Press* handed me a CD one day and asked me to examine the contents. It was a script written by one Pakistani Ambassador *Arshad Sami Khan*, former PAF Sqn Ldr decorated with a 'Sitara-i-Jurat' during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. He had the unique distinction of having served with three Presidents (namely Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto) of Pakistan, as their ADC before side-stepping to the Pakistan Govt's Foreign Service. The copious notes made by him during this eventful period in Pakistan’s history formed the script of what was handed over to me. Once I opened the CD, I remained glued to my computer for hours together. It was a revealing and fascinating account of the Presidential personalities, political dramas, games played behind the scenes in the highest echelons of power in Pakistan and palace-intrigues (read Presidency) in Pakistan. It also reflected, at places on global personalities including some from India. That is what a young PAF officer observed, noted and perceived - the mind-boggling happenings around him at the very top. It was a 'potboiler' and I instantly agreed to edit the script and give it the shape that it needed. The book – *"Three Presidents and an Aide"* was released in Delhi by Capt Amarinder Singh in *2008*. Somehow it never received the due publicity and scrutiny it deserved, either in Pakistan _for obvious reasons,_ and in India too, for lack of adequate publicity and other events overwhelming the public scenario at that time. A few days ago I pulled out the only copy left with me to recount certain facts on 71 Operations, from a Pakistani viewpoint. And what a revelation it is! Specific to Bangladesh, *Sami Khan*’s account clears many a doubt. This piece on East Pakistan in its final days and the creation of Bangladesh draws heavily from Sami Khan’s book. *16 to 20 Nov 1971* The *Battle of Garibpur* in close proximity to Jessore, was the harbinger of Bad News. It led to the *Declaration of Emergency* in Pakistan and the setting up of an *Emergency Council*. A hurried civilian government was put together with the aeged *Nurul Amin* from the East as the *Prime Minister*, and *Zulfikar Bhutto* (Friend to a Foe, to Friend again) as the *Dy PM* cum *Foreign Minister*. Bhutto had earlier supported the *Imposition of Martial Law in East Pakistan*. After that - he was side-lined, to be brought back again to salvage the situation at the political level. Concerned at the imminent War and limited international support from its Allies, Yahya decided to despatch a *secret delegation* to Pakistan’s "all-weather friend" *China*. *Bhutto* was selected to lead the delegation accompanied by Yahya’s confidants, *Lt Gen Gul Hassan* and *Air Marshal Rahim Khan*. The latter two were added overtly to discuss the military situation, but _covertly_ *for the purpose of keeping an eye on Bhutto* and report back the true picture to President Yahya. They met Chinese Premier *Chou Enlai* and Foreign Minister *Chen Ye*, who assured them China’s full support to Pakistan. *China also advised Pakistan to avert war till the spring of 1972*, when the Himalayan Passes would open up for possible military intervention, if required. It was here that *Bhutto hatched a conspiracy to mislead Yahya*....... *China had clearly expressed its inability to assist Pakistan militarily during the winter months*, but Yahya was made to feel secure by his trusted Delegation Members saying that the superbly trained Chinese Special Forces Divisions alteady positioned in Tibet & Sinkiang can intervene even during the Himalayan winters...... As per Sami Khan, *there was no guarantee that India would have fallen for any 'ruse' to wait for the winters to pass*, but this deliberate "misinformation" emboldened Yahya, *who accepted the advice to launch the offensive during the peak winters in December 1971*. *The End Game: Last few weeks and the Machiavellian Moves within Pak Establishment* *10-20 November 1971*. President Yahya Khan, an eternal 'optimist' would at times get riled at the number of Fronts he had to deal with, East & West Pakistan; Martial Law; deteriorating Political, Economic and Diplomatic situations – _and hardly ever any Good News!_ Yet he was hopeful that he will pull things off, fix East Pakistan, avert War and settle scores with his Pakistani Political Opponents to continue on as the President. This false hope to a large extent was the result of 'sycophants' surrounding the President. Interestingly, one evening the ‘spirited’ President picked up two balloons after a Party and kicked them in the air and said, “here goes *Bhutto*, and here goes *Mujib*”. Little did he know that they were about to burst in his face, with full force just a few weeks later. *The 'D' Day* On *02 Dec 1971*, Yahya received a long signal from *Gen AAK Niazi*, GOC and Martial Law Administrator, East Pakistan, about *Jessore* being under imminent Threat. This was in line with earlier communications of increasing military pressure from the Mukti Bahini and Indian Army. Yahya hurriedly convened a meeting of the entire top military brass at the GHQ the next day, *03 Dec 1971*. Briefing the top military leadership, the *Chief of General Staff*, *Lt Gen Gul Hassan* recommended War against India, reminding Gen Yahya of his public pledge not to lose an inch of territory. To a concerned Yahya, all the top-ranking officers of the Pakistan Armed Forces nodded their heads in unison! *Air Marshal Rahim Khan* took over from then on, and laid out the *Pre-Emptive Air Strikes Plan* to immobilise the numerically superior IAF. The other two Services would open their offensives simultaneously. Young Sami Khan was worried. Having been privy to the build-up leading up to the D Day, he had serious reservations about the outcome of the War. The 'end-game' had begun. *3 to 9 Dec 1971* PAF launched the Pre-Emptive Strikes on India's forward Airbases all along the border in a bid to achieve surprise and inflict maximum damage. The damage was however limited due to IAF having learnt the Lessons from the 1965 War and also from the Israeli-Arab War of 1967 to not park any aircrafts in the open but only in bombproof concrete shelters, and thereafter the IAF responded with a massive riposte. Yahya was pleased with the initial actions in the West, but that euphoria vanished soon as the Indian Armed Forces seized the initiative on all Fronts and the push-back was strong. On *09 Dec*, Governor *Malik* from East Pakistan spoke with the President on the secure 'Sacraphone' channel and painted a gloomy picture. Gen *Niazi* too sought a quick political solution, before the Pakistani military in the East gets decimated. *Yahya then authorised Malik and Niazi to take actions as deemed necessary, to save the Armed Forces garrisons and Pak administration in East Pakistan*. *09-13 Dec 1971* Pakistan’s long-held strategic belief that "East Pakistan’s security lay in the West", was crumbling quickly. Defences in East Pakistan were crumbling like a house of cards. Pakistan’s Offensives in the West had been blunted, and the Indian Army, Navy and Airforce were all on the offensive, with the IAF hitting targets deep inside and the Navy striking the oil storage tanks at Karachi. A panic-stricken *Yahya wanted a UN-supervised Ceasefire at the earliest*. With the USSR solidly 'vetoing' all such moves at the UN, *Yahya dispatched Bhutto to the UN* on the advice of *Lt Gen Gul Hassan* and *Air Marshal Rahim Khan*. His charter was to find a diplomatic solution to end the War, and allow Pakistan to work out a domestic political solution. *13 Dec 1971* After repeated attempts by Yahya, *President Nixon* finally returned the call at around *2 AM* Pakistan time. Yahya literally jumped out of his bed to take the call, and instructed Sami Khan to hold the parallel line, lest the precious call gets disconnected. *Nixon promised full support to Pakistan* and intimated Yahya that he had ordered *Task Force 74* of the *7th Fleet* in the Pacific to steam into the Bay of Bengal and rescue the beleaguered Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. An ecstatic Yahya woke up his *COS Lt Gen Hameed*, recounted the conversation and finally said “Haam, you tell Niazi to hold on to East Pakistan. The Americans are on their way.” That was the first and the last message on the 7th Fleet, which never really showed up, as Pakistani hopes kept sinking deep into the depths of the Bay of Bengal! *15 Dec 1971 (Military Situation)* *Gen AAK Niazi* ("Tiger Niazi" to his colleagues), under severe military pressure and incessant offensive from the Indian Armed Forces and isolated from all directions, approached the *US Consul General* in Dhaka seeking *an immediate "Ceasefire", Protection of all Pakistani Forces in East Pakistan, and an assurance by the Indian Army for their protection and no Reprisals*. In Rawalpindi, upon receiving the signal from Niazi, Yahya addressed the nation on TV and radio and acknowledged the ‘unfortunate temporary setback’. He also conveyed his resolve to continue fighting on the Western Front till *complete victory* was achieved. The Emergency Council and the Military Leadership of Pakistan, however was increasingly aware of the dangers of prolonging the War as they realised that India was capable of inflicting grave damage to its military infrastructure and economic centres in West Pakistan, especially as the entire weight could be shifted to India's Western Theatre. They now unanimously advised that the President would have to rethink his resolve. *15 Dec 1971 (Diplomatic Situation)* With the Soviets voting against US-sponsored UN Resolutions for an immediate Ceasefire, Pakistan was running out of *Options*. But literally "out of the blue", a *Poland*-sponsored resolution for an Immediate Cease-Fire was moved at the *UN General Assembly*. President Yahya and his staff learnt about this Resolution through media reports the next day! Yahya, furious with his Foreign Office, tried to contact *Bhutto* in *New York* to instruct him to accept the Resolution forthwith. Bhutto, however, *was incommunicado*, (either pretending to be too sick with 'influenza' or too 'drugged' to talk, or simply *not available* at the Hotel! Unable to contact his Foreign Minister, a frantic Yahya then got hold of *Agha Shahi*, Pakistan’s permanent envoy at the UN and ordered him to accept the Polish Resolution without delay. Bhutto then finally emerged from his room in *Hotel Astoria* on the morning of 15th Dec. It was Bhutto’s turn to speak at the *UN Security Council*, convened at Pakistan’s request to discuss the situation. Bhutto walked up to the podium and in a fiery address blamed the International Community for inaction while his country disintegrated, then he dramatically tore up the notes in his hand, and soon walked off the stage stating *“I am not a rat; inflict what you may, I shall go back and fight.”* In place of garnering the badly needed support, Bhutto in fact had antagonised the General Assembly, _hardly an effective way to counter the world’s largest democracy_. *India accepted the UN Resolution for a Cease-Fire on 16 Dec*. *16 Dec 1971* Lt Gen AAK Niazi, Martial Law Administrator *Zone 'B' & GOC East Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan signed the *Instrument of Surrender* and handed it over to Lt Gen JS Aurora, GOC-in-C, Indian Army's Eastern Command. India also accepted the Polish Resolution at the General Assembly and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi unilaterally declared *"Ceasefire"* and ordered cessation of all hostilities in both the Theatres of War. *17 Dec 1971* The scene at the Pakistan Presidency was one of disbelief and despondency. Yahya had vowed to continue the War. There was public outrage at the serious reverses on both Fronts. Bangladesh was a reality. And the public was yet to be informed of *90,000 POWs* and a loss of approx. *2000 sq Kms* in the West. Pakistan military’s top brass met at the Presidency to decide on the future course of events. *Suddenly the news of revolt by the 6 Armoured Division Artillery Brigade* was conveyed by *Gen Gul Hassan*. Its highly-regarded Commander, *Brig FB Ali* had decided to arrest the *GOC* of *6 Armoured Division* on charges of cowardice in battle! *The brigade was also supposedly on the move to Islamabad*, heading for the Presidency. Yahya was alarmed – revolt in the Army was the last thing he wanted to hear. It could snowball into a general revolt and the public’s ire would be difficult to contain. A couple of hours later into the evening, a visibly tired *Yahya declared his intention to resign* and hand over the reins to the elected civilian leader of West Pakistan *Z A Bhutto*.