| This Is What Made the Attack on Israel Possible

| This Is What Made the Attack on Israel Possible Unlike the 1973 war, the failure of 2023 was systemic: It was seen in the lack of intelligence, the military’s inadequate reaction and the absent of political leadership Uri Bar-Joseph Oct 8, 2023 Comparing the disgrace of 2023 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973 is natural and not unfounded. Thousands of words have already been written on this, and there will be countless more. We still lack solid information and a basic understanding of what happened on Saturday, October 7. Even the partial understanding we do have allows for a preliminary comparison, however. The most striking difference is that in 1973, the failure wasn’t systemic. The failure was personal, involving a few key individuals whose grave errors made the defensive lines prepared by the military ineffective at the moment of truth. When IDF troops spend more time guarding settlements and religious worshipers at Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus than in rigorous training, the outcome is clear. The 2023 debacle is a systemic failure at all levels, not one caused by individual mistakes. Failure was seen in the lack of intelligence, the military’s inadequate reaction, and the political leadership. In 1973, the intelligence-gathering system worked perfectly. On a strategic level, Egypt’s war intentions were known. The war plans kept in all division commanders’ vaults were also stored in the vaults of the Military Intelligence Directorate. Breaking news and analyses delivered to your inbox Click Here Open gallery view Brig. Gen. (res.) Nimrod Shifroni, Commander of the Israeli Air Force Tomer Bar, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Military Secretary to the Prime Minister Avi Gil, today at the Kirya military base in Tel Aviv.Credit: Amos Ben Gershom / GPO Thousands of reports from observation posts along the Suez Canal confirmed Egyptian preparations, and wireless transmissions intercepted by signals intelligence revealed unusually high preparation for war among the Egyptian military. None of this led to an explicit warning of imminent war owing to some senior Military Intelligence officers who stuck to a false narrative until the last minute. The failure of 2023 was systemic in terms of the gathering and evaluation of intelligence by both Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet security service. While we still don’t have the full details, it’s clear that Israel’s intelligence-gathering capabilities, which were able to detect a tiny fly buzzing near a Hamas operative, failed to detect such a large-scale operation by several organizations preparing for an all-out attack on Israel’s Gaza border communities. Israel-Gaza war: A catastrophic failure that will send political shockwaves This is a catastrophe for Israel. But it’s not another Yom Kippur War Netanyahu bears responsibility Unlike preparations for a single terror attack, which can be concealed, what happened Saturday took a comprehensive plan and hundreds of people who maintained secrecy from a country with sophisticated intelligence capabilities that constantly monitor Gaza but failed to issue a warning. Even though Israel has satellites, powerful monitoring drones, and other advanced technological tools, it failed to recognize that Hamas had assembled forces and launched assault paragliders with the encouragement of thousands along the border. In 1973, intelligence-gathering resulted in dozens of warnings delivered days in advance indicating that Egypt and Syria were headed for war with Israel. In 2023, however, the warning was only sent after Hamas had crossed the Gaza border fence. There is no precedent in the history of Israeli intelligence for such a monumental failure. The differences between the Israel Defense Forces of 1973 and that of today are heartbreaking. The IDF of 1973 was the best in the country’s history. It was well-prepared for war, well-equipped (despite all the claims made in hindsight), well-trained, and battle-tested. The rapid transition from initial defeats to counterattacks on both fronts, as well as its ability to end the war the way it did, were clear demonstrations of its abilities. On October 7, it became clear what a military whose main mission is occupation – at least since the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 – looks like. Gaza fell there Saturday night. Gen. William DePuy, commander of U.S. military training and doctrine between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, carefully studied the IDF’s performance during the Yom Kippur War. Toward the end of his research, he said there was no military in the world like the IDF and probably never would be. It’s hard to find words to describe today’s IDF. We will see how it functions later in the war, but it’s worth noting one old, well-known fact: the quality of a military is mainly decided by the quality of the enemy. When the enemy is Palestinian civilians and when IDF troops spend more time guarding settlements and religious worshipers at Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus than in rigorous training, the outcome is clear. On October 7, it became clear what a military whose main mission is occupation – at least since the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 – looks like. It’s unclear how it will meet its upcoming challenges, but there is some nostalgia for the professionalism and resilience of 1973’s IDF. Comparing the political leadership of 1973 to today’s is also discouraging. Although discredited and slandered after the war and removed from their positions, Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan acted responsibly. The failure originated from misleading and false intelligence received from Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira, the director of Military Intelligence and reassuring intelligence assessments. Records of the time, however, reveal that when the threat of war arose a year earlier, Meir ensured that the home front was prepared, coordination with the United States was steady, and the IDF had everything it needed to win. Dayan was well-versed in the war plans. He outlined a realistic strategy and carefully considered all that would be necessary. Because of the intelligence misconception, the political leadership was eventually also perceived as unprepared. The surprise showed its effects on Dayan, especially on October 7, the day after the surprise attack against Israel. Not much needs to be said about today’s political leadership. Take a look at the composition of the security cabinet, listen to the leaks emerging from its meeting, gaze upon Netanyahu’s demeanor, and hear the tsunami of curses his coalition members hurled at the best of the IDF’s officers. What a disgrace and a disaster. The war has just begun, and it’s still too early to draw any conclusions. However, we can note lessons from the Yom Kippur War and their relevance to the present. “Better Sharm el-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm el-Sheikh,” Dayan said before that war. After the war and its heavy cost, he realized that peace without Sharm el-Sheikh was better. He pressured Prime Minister Menachem Begin to agree to a deal giving Israel peace and Egypt the Sinai Peninsula down to its last grain of sand. We should remember this lesson when Netanyahu talks about revenge and the TV commentators rage about reoccupying the Gaza Strip and annihilating Hamas. Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians has been long and bitter. They will not give up their aspiration for their own state, and we now understand even more the price of this continuous conflict. The answer is ultimately to end the occupation and implement the solution of two states based on the pre-1967 borders while preserving and developing the military’s strength. Uri Bar-Joseph is a professor emeritus in the International Relations Department at Haifa University’s School for Political Science. He is the author of “Resilience, The IDF and the Yom Kippur War” and several other books.